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Abstract
This paper employs stochastic simulations of the New Area-Wide Model—a micro-
founded open-economy model developed at the ECB—to investigate the consequences
of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for the evolution of risks to price
stability in the euro area during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Using a formal measure of
the balance of risks, which is derived from policy-makers’ preferences about inﬂation
outcomes, we ﬁrst show that downside risks to price stability were considerably greater
than upside risks during the ﬁrst half of 2009, followed by a gradual rebalancing of
these risks until mid-2011 and a renewed deterioration thereafter. We ﬁnd that the
lower bound has induced a noticeable downward bias in the risk balance throughout
our evaluation period because of the implied ampliﬁcation of deﬂation risks. We then
illustrate that, with nominal interest rates close to zero, forward guidance in the form
of a time-based conditional commitment to keep interest rates low for longer can be
successful in mitigating downside risks to price stability. However, we ﬁnd that the pro-
vision of time-based forward guidance may give rise to upside risks over the medium
term if extended too far into the future. By contrast, time-based forward guidance
complemented with a threshold condition concerning tolerable future inﬂation can pro-
vide insurance against the materialisation of such upside risks.
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The recent ﬁnancial crisis has posed serious challenges for the assessment of risks to price
stability in the euro area. The sharp contraction in economic activity at the onset of the
crisis in 2008 put downward pressure on prices beyond the short-run impact of the drop in
commodity prices observed at that time. This gave rise to concerns that the euro area may
eventually enter a situation leading to a sustained and broad-based fall in the aggregate price
level, i.e. deﬂation.1 The European Central Bank (ECB), like other major central banks
around the world, responded to the unfolding events by rapidly reducing its key interest
rates to historically low levels in order to support aggregate demand and to forestall a
further loss of conﬁdence. While the downward pressure on prices eventually receded with
the start of a muted, albeit vulnerable recovery in late 2009, the outlook for the economy
has remained subject to a heightened degree of uncertainty.2
Against this background, we aim to provide a model-based narrative of the evolution
of the risks to price stability in the euro area during the course of the ﬁnancial crisis. We
do so by employing stochastic simulations of the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM),
a micro-founded open-economy model of the euro area designed for forecasting and policy
analysis; see Christoﬀel, Coenen and Warne (2008). Importantly, with short-term nominal
interest rates at historically low levels, the model-based simulations recognise the existence
of a (zero) lower bound on nominal interest rates which limits the scope for monetary policy
to provide additional stimulus using its standard interest rate instruments.3 Moreover, the
simulations are conducted in a real-time setting, covering the period from late 2008 to the
end of 2011. Thus they enable us to construct predictive distributions for the inﬂation
outlook which capture the uncertainty pertaining to unforeseeable future events at diﬀerent
points in time. To enhance the realism of our risk assessment, we construct the model-based
predictive distributions using Consensus Economics forecast vintages as a reference point.
In so doing, we account for the sequence of revisions that were made to inﬂation forecasts
over time on the basis of a broader information set as well as diﬀerent models and analytical
perspectives. These revisions have often been substantial, with notable consequences for
the assessment of the risks to price stability in the euro area.
1See, e.g., IMF (2009) and WSJ (2009).
2In fact, severe setbacks in the recovery were due to the re-intensiﬁcation of the crisis on account of
elevated tensions in euro area sovereign debt markets in the course of 2010 and 2011.
3The ECB also implemented a number of non-standard monetary policy measures, including the provi-
sion of unlimited liquidity to the banking system, to sustain ﬁnancial intermediation and to maintain the
availability of credit to the private sector; see ECB (2010a). For an analysis of the ﬁscal response to the
crisis in the euro area, see European Commission (2009), ECB (2010b) and Coenen, Straub and Trabandt
(2012, 2013).
1Our analysis of risks to price stability builds on a literature that has used structural
macroeconomic models to study the consequences of the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates for the eﬃcacy of monetary policy, including studies by Reifschneider and
Williams (2000), Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland (2004) and Williams (2009). While
these studies have focused on how the zero lower bound aﬀects the properties of the models’
steady-state distributions with a view to designing monetary policy strategies that help to
mitigate the zero lower bound impact, we study the evolution of risks to price stability
during the crisis on the basis of model-based predictive distributions. A similar approach
has been taken by Chung, Laforte, Reifschneider and Williams (2011), yet with a focus on
assessing the likelihood that a range of diﬀerent models would have predicted the actual
macroeconomic outcomes prior to the onset of the crisis.
Our model-based assessment of risks to price stability shows that deﬂation risks (de-
ﬁned as the probability of observing at least four consecutive quarters of negative annual
inﬂation rates over the respective forecast horizon) were highest for the March and June
2009 Consensus Economics forecast vintages. They diminished subsequently, but edged
up again in the second half of 2011 following the re-intensiﬁcation of the crisis due to el-
evated tensions in euro area sovereign debt markets. By contrast, excess inﬂation risks
(deﬁned as the probability of observing at least four consecutive quarters of annual inﬂa-
tion above 2%) were lowest for the early 2009 forecast vintages and increased thereafter.
A formal measure of the balance of risks advocated by Kilian and Manganelli (2007), which
is based on policy-makers’ preferences about inﬂation outcomes and takes the severity of
deﬂation and excess inﬂation events into account, suggests that downside risks to price sta-
bility were considerably greater than upside risks during the ﬁrst half of 2009. This episode
was followed by a gradual rebalancing of risks until mid-2011. Thereafter the risk balance
started to turn negative again. The model-based analysis demonstrates that the zero lower
bound has induced a noticeable downward bias in the risk balance throughout the crisis
period because of the implied ampliﬁcation of deﬂation risks.
Whereas our analysis oﬀers ﬁrst and foremost a real-time narrative of the consequences
of the ﬁnancial crisis for the evolution of risks to price stability through the lens of the
NAWM, the employed methodology of stochastic simulations can also be used to examine
the eﬀects of counterfactual policy measures. As an illustration, we examine the eﬀective-
ness of providing forward guidance concerning the path of future short-term nominal interest
rates as a means to delivering additional stimulus in a situation where nominal interest rates
are close to zero and where downside risks to price stability prevail.4 Within the NAWM,
4For an exposition of the theoretical underpinnings of forward guidance at the zero lower bound, see, e.g.,
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006), Nakov (2008), Walsh (2009) and Levin, L´ opez-
2forward guidance is implemented as a time-based conditional commitment to keep the nom-
inal interest rate at the zero lower bound for a certain number of additional quarters, over
and above the number of quarters for which the interest rate would be constrained by the
zero lower bound in the absence of the conditional commitment. Focusing on the December
2011 forecast vintage as a reference point, the model-based simulations suggest that this
form of forward guidance imparts the intended stimulus and can be successful in reducing
the prevailing downside risks to price stability. Yet if if extended too far into the future, it
may—through its impact on inﬂation expectations—create higher inﬂationary momentum
than desired, eventually leading to upside risks to price stability over the medium term.
In this regard, we show that complementing the time-based commitment with a threshold
condition concerning tolerable future inﬂation developments can provide insurance against
the materialisation of such upside risks.
While the simulations with the NAWM illustrate the general merits of forward guidance,
it is important to note that the two forms of forward guidance considered in this paper
diﬀer from the forward guidance-policy actually adopted by the ECB in summer 2013. The
ECB’s forward guidance is outcome-based and not time or time-cum-threshold-based as in
the simulations.5 It is also important to note that the eﬀects which we obtain using the
NAWM are likely to provide an upper bound for the potency of forward guidance to the
extent that the commitment in the model-based analysis is perfectly credible. Throughout
our analysis we abstract from issues that could arise under imperfect credibility, and focus
on the case—as in nearly all of the existing zero lower bound literature—where the policy-
maker has a perfect commitment technology. A notable exception is the recent study by
Bodenstein, Hebden and Nunes (2012), which considers the case of imperfect credibility and
addresses the inherent time inconsistency of forward guidance because of the temptation to
tighten policy once the economy strengthens and/or inﬂation resurfaces.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the evolution
of deﬂation and excess inﬂation risks over the crisis period, focusing on the probabilities
of certain deﬂation and excess inﬂation events. Section 3 proceeds by introducing and
evaluating a formal measure of the balance of risks to price stability and ascertains its
sensitivity to alternative assumptions. Section 4 studies the eﬀects of forward guidance;
and Section 5 concludes. A brief overview of the NAWM and technical details of the
analysis are deferred to appendices.
Salido, Nelson and Yun (2010). Woodford (2012) oﬀers a broader perspective on forward guidance, including
on the practical experience of the Federal Reserve with the introduction of forward guidance.
5For details on the modalities of the forward guidance provided by the ECB’s Governing Council, see
ECB (2013).
32 Risks to price stability and the lower bound
Forecasts are a central element in the deliberations of monetary policy-makers regarding
the outlook for the economy and the calibration of the stance of monetary policy. Yet
point forecasts fail to convey the large uncertainty which pertains to unforeseen events
and developments over the forecast horizon. That uncertainty can be captured by density
forecasts, or predictive distributions.
In an attempt to characterise the forecast uncertainty prevailing at diﬀerent points
in time over the crisis period and to gauge the evolution of the associated risks to price
stability, we will utilise predictive distributions based on the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model
(NAWM), which is a micro-founded open-economy model of the euro area designed for use
in the ECB/Eurosystem staﬀ projections and for policy analysis.6 In deriving the predictive
distributions, we shall allow the short-term nominal interest rate to react to new shocks
that may occur over the forecast horizon according to the NAWM’s estimated monetary
policy rule, while recognising the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates.7 As we shall
demonstrate below, the existence of the zero lower bound has important consequences for
the evolution of the risks to price stability over the crisis period.
To the extent that policy-makers do not base their deliberations mechanically on any
single model-based forecast, however, we start from baseline forecasts that incorporate a
wider range of data and account for diﬀerent models and perspectives, namely the forecast
vintages provided by Consensus Economics. These vintages are released at a quarterly
frequency in early March, June, September and December of each calendar year. We then
employ stochastic simulations of the NAWM to obtain predictive distributions around these
baseline forecasts.8 That is, we rely on a model-based characterisation of uncertainty,
including the eﬀects that arise from the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, but
account for the sequence of revisions that were made to the baseline forecasts over time on
the basis of a broader information set.9
6For a detailed description of the NAWM, see Christoﬀel, Coenen and Warne (2008). A sketch of its
basic structure is provided in Appendix A.
7That is, we do not allow for a feedback from the quantiﬁed risks to price stability to the interest-rate
prescriptions of the estimated policy rule. Rather, the risk assessment is conducted ex-post on the basis of
the model’s predictive distributions which depend, inter alia, on the characteristics of the policy rule.
8For details on the compilation of the Consensus Economics forecast vintages that we use in the analysis
and the construction of our real-time data set, see Appendix B. Technical details on the stochastic simulations
that we conduct around the baseline forecasts and on the solution method that we use to solve the NAWM
subject to the zero lower bound constraint are provided in Appendix C.
9Throughout our paper, we maintain the assumption that the forecasters surveyed by Consensus Eco-
nomics have not taken into account the consequences of the zero lower bound themselves. This assumption
will be correct if the forecasters are agnostic about the lower bound, or if they rely on linear models and
4Risks to price stability: March 2009
By means of example, Figure 1 displays the March 2009 Consensus forecast vintage as
well as the mean and the 70% and 90% conﬁdence bands of the associated NAWM-based
predictive distributions for annual consumer price inﬂation (measured in terms of the private
consumption deﬂator), annual real GDP growth and the short-term nominal interest rate
(corresponding to the annualised 3-month EURIBOR).
With regard to consumer price inﬂation (see the upper left panel in Figure 1), an increas-
ing part of the predictive distribution lies below zero, while a substantial part continues to
lie above inﬂation rates consistent with the ECB’s quantitative deﬁnition of price stability
with inﬂation below, but close to 2%. Accordingly, the distribution is markedly skewed
to the downside, and its mean falls increasingly below the Consensus baseline path over
the outer years of the forecast horizon. Similar properties are found for the predictive
distribution of real GDP growth (see the upper right panel in the ﬁgure).
The reason for the asymmetry of the predictive distributions is that, with short-term
nominal interest rates having been lowered to unprecedented levels to support the economy
in the face of large negative demand shocks, the reaction of monetary policy to new reces-
sionary and deﬂationary shocks over the forecast horizon is eventually constrained by the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. In the simulations, this happens with an aver-
age incidence of 15.9% across all quarters of the forecast horizon. Hence, the lower bound
constraint implies a piling-up and a skew to the upside of the predictive distribution for the
short-term nominal interest rate, with the interest rate being somewhat higher on average
than in the baseline path (see the lower left panel in Figure 1).10 If the zero lower bound
were not to be taken into account, the predictive distributions for consumer price inﬂation,
real GDP growth and the short-term nominal interest rate would all be symmetric, and
their means would be equal to the values in the baseline paths.
In assessing risks to price stability on the basis of the predictive distribution for consumer
price inﬂation, we distinguish downside and upside risks. We associate downside risks with
the emergence of deﬂation, which can be deﬁned as the event that annual inﬂation falls
tools in producing their forecasts which do not account for the non-linearity induced by the lower bound.
Otherwise our analysis may overestimate the importance of the zero lower bound as a factor determining
downside risks to price stability. Accordingly, our assessment ought to be seen as providing an upper bound
for the importance of downside risks in connection with the zero lower bound.
10In the NAWM, the lower bound is actually imposed at an interest rate level of 65 basis points, reﬂecting
the fact that the interest rate path for the March 2009 forecast vintage is derived from 3-month EURIBOR
futures, which diﬀer from market expectations of the EONIA by a spread representing counter-party and
liquidity risk of about 65 basis points on average over the forecast horizon. In other words, the lower bound
considered in the model-based simulations derives from a zero bound on the EONIA, which then translates
into a lower bound for the EURIBOR given by the average spread.
5below zero for at least 4 consecutive quarters. This deﬁnition is motivated by the widely
held belief that negative inﬂation rates ought to become a concern for policy-makers only
in cases where they are persistent and translate into a sustained fall in the aggregate price
level.11 Similarly, we consider upside risks, with the notion of excess inﬂation being deﬁned
as an event that annual inﬂation is above 2% for at least 4 consecutive quarters.12 Based
on these deﬁnitions, the deﬂation risk, i.e. the probability that the deﬂation event occurs,
is found to equal 13.9% on average across all quarters of the forecast horizon, whereas the
excess inﬂation risk is 11.6%.
Does the March 2009 forecast vintage, and the associated predictive distribution for
inﬂation, signify a period with heightened deﬂation risks as feared, inter alia, by the IMF
(2009)? To address this question we examine next the evolution of the downside and upside
risks to price stability, from the onset of the crisis in late 2008 until the end of 2011.
Risks to price stability: December 2008 to December 2011
Our ﬁndings regarding the evolution of deﬂation and excess inﬂation risks from the De-
cember 2008 to the December 2011 forecast vintage are summarised in Table 1, while the
underlying predictive distributions are shown in Appendix Figure A. As a benchmark for
assessing the importance of the deﬂation and excess inﬂation risks associated with the in-
dividual forecast vintages, we consider the values of the risks implied by the predictive
distribution for inﬂation that has been initialised in the NAWM’s steady state; see the val-
ues in the bottom line of the table.13 Compared with—in slight abuse of terminology—a
steady-state deﬂation risk of 1.5%, our ﬁndings indeed suggest that deﬂation risks in March
2009 were signiﬁcantly elevated, yet with deﬂation risks in June 2009 being even some-
what higher, at 14.8% on average. From September 2009 onwards, the deﬂation risks have
gradually diminished, but they edged up again in the second half of 2011 following the
re-intensiﬁcation of the crisis due to the build-up of tensions in some euro area sovereign
debt markets.14 By contrast, excess inﬂation risks were exceptionally low throughout 2009
11The same deﬁnition has been used by, e.g., IMF staﬀ when assessing deﬂation risks in Japan, the United
States and the euro area with the Global Projection Model (GPM); see Clinton, Garcia-Saltos, Johnson,
Kamenik and Laxton (2010).
12The conﬁdence bands for consumer price inﬂation in Figure 1 allow for spells of inﬂation above 2%
and inﬂation spells below zero that are shorter than 4 consecutive quarters. Since the shortest spell can be
only one quarter, the conﬁdence bands represent medium-term as well as short-term risks. The focus of the
analysis in this paper is on the former. Probabilities for diﬀering deﬁnitions of excess inﬂation or deﬂation
events can be easily obtained from the predictive distribution of inﬂation.
13The NAWM features a steady-state nominal interest rate of 4.4% per annum, which is composed of a
steady-state inﬂation rate of 1.9% per annum, consistent with the ECB’s quantitative deﬁnition of price
stability, and an equilibrium real interest rate of 2.5% per annum.
14The estimated probabilities are based on the full length of the respective forecast sample. This means
6and have increased thereafter, reaching a peak in the ﬁrst half of 2011.
One important factor explaining the heightened deﬂation risks in the ﬁrst half of 2009 is
the proﬁle of the baseline forecasts for annual inﬂation; see Appendix Figure A. Following
the sharp fall in commodity prices in the second half of 2008, inﬂation rates decelerated
markedly, with a trough below, albeit near zero reached in summer 2009. Owing to base
eﬀects and a partial reversal of the previous drop in commodity prices, inﬂation rates picked
up in autumn 2009, even though underlying inﬂationary pressures remained contained on
account of the slack in the economy and on the back of a muted recovery.
A second important factor, which we emphasise in our paper, concerns the role of the
zero lower bound for nominal interest rates. The short-term nominal interest rate had been
sharply reduced by early 2009 in swift response to the unfolding crisis, and the incidence of
hitting the lower bound has consequently shifted upward to on average 15.9% in March 2009,
compared to a steady-state incidence of 0.3%; see the far right column in Table 1. The even
higher lower bound incidence recorded for the June and September 2010 forecast vintages is
due to a downward shift in the expected paths of future short-term nominal interest rates;
see Appendix Figure A. This downward shift was triggered by the intensiﬁcation of the crisis
during the ﬁrst half of 2010 as a result of the deteriorating ﬁscal situation in a number of
euro area countries. The heightened lower bound incidence gave rise to an increased skew
to the downside of the predictive distributions for both real GDP growth and consumer
price inﬂation, amplifying the prevailing deﬂation risks. The increased downside skew in
turn interacted with the lower bound via a negative feedback-loop, as nominal interest rates
could not be lowered to balance such skew, and further elevated the lower bound incidence.
Similar developments occurred in the second half of 2011, when the tensions in sovereign
debt markets re-intensiﬁed.
Nevertheless, the growing impact of the lower bound incidence on deﬂation risks in 2010
was eventually oﬀset by upward revisions to the baseline forecast for inﬂation in 2010 and
in early 2011 (see Appendix Figure A), with the net eﬀect that deﬂation risks decreased.
However, with the worsening of sovereign debt market tensions in the second half of 2011,
when short-term interest rates were lowered further and market expectations of future
interest rates fell to unprecedented levels, the lower bound incidence reached historical
highs and deﬂation risks started to rise again.
that 9 quarters are included in the sample for the December forecast vintages, 10 for the September, 11 for
the June, and 12 for the March vintages; see Appendix B for details. Since the width of the predictive distri-
butions increases with the sample length, there is a small bias in the estimated probabilities in comparison
to those obtained when only the ﬁrst 9 quarters are counted. See Appendix Table A for the corresponding
probabilities estimated for a uniform sample length of 9 quarters.
7Risks to price stability: The calendar year 2011
Whereas Table 1 provides an assessment of the evolution of deﬂation and excess inﬂation
risks for the forecast vintages from December 2008 to December 2011 and for the full length
of the respective forecast horizons, Table 2 zooms in on the risks pertaining to a particular
calendar year, namely 2011. This year is covered in full by all our forecast vintages up to
March 2011, except for the December 2008 vintage. Deﬂation risks for 2011 are found to
diminish from one forecast vintage to the next, the underlying factors being twofold. First,
the forecast horizon is moving forward by one quarter for each consecutive forecast vintage.
Therefore, with the predictive distributions gradually fanning out over the forecast horizon,
an increasingly smaller part of the predictive distribution for inﬂation tends to lie below zero
in the calendar year 2011. And second, the diminishing deﬂation risk reﬂects the successive
upward revisions of the baseline forecasts for inﬂation in 2011; see Appendix Figure A. These
two factors are partly oﬀ-set by the increased downward bias in the predictive distributions
for inﬂation on account of the heightened zero lower bound incidence in 2011. Similarly,
excess inﬂation risks for 2011 are re-assessed over time to be increasing, following a sequence
of downward revisions in 2009 and early 2010.
3 Assessing the balance of risks to price stability
The risk measures in Tables 1 and 2 are given by the probabilities that certain deﬂation
and excess inﬂation events will occur based on the predictive distributions of the NAWM.
Measures of risk, however, may also take the severity of the events of concern into account
(see, e.g., Machina and Rothschild, 1987). For example, an average excess inﬂation rate
of 2.5% with an excess inﬂation probability of 20% may be regarded as less risky than an
average excess inﬂation rate of 4% with a probability of 5%. Risk measures that take the
severity of events into account were initially considered in the context of portfolio allocation
decisions (see Fishburn, 1977, and Holthausen, 1981) but have more recently been adapted
to macroeconomic forecasting (see Kilian and Manganelli, 2007).
Loss function-based risk measures
Following Kilian and Manganelli (2007), Figure 2 displays a parametric family of loss func-
tions for the preferences of a policy-maker regarding alternative inﬂation outcomes.15 In
15To the extent that the policy-maker is also concerned about ﬂuctuations in output around potential, it
should be straightforward to augment the family of loss functions with an output gap term, like in the vast
literature on ﬂexible inﬂation targeting; see, e.g., Svensson (1997).
8line with the exposition in the previous section, it is assumed that the lower bound deﬁn-
ing deﬂation is equal to zero, while excess inﬂation is determined by the upper bound of
2%. Within these bounds the loss is zero, whereas a positive loss is attached to inﬂation
outcomes outside the range of [0, 2]. The graphs in the ﬁgure can be interpreted as an
index of the degree of dissatisfaction that the policy-maker experiences as the inﬂation rate
varies. Parameter a is the exponential weight attached to downside deviations from zero,
while parameter b is the exponential weight given to upside deviations from 2%. Since these
parameters need not necessarily be equal, the policy-maker’s preferences can be asymmetric
with respect to downside and upside risks.
Given that the policy-maker wishes to minimise the expected loss, his preferences are
weighted by the probabilities attached to alternative inﬂation outcomes. When parameter
a is zero, the policy-maker only cares about the probability of deﬂation and not about the
severity of the deﬂation outcome. This is reﬂected in the loss being constant for all inﬂation
outcomes below zero. Similarly, if parameter b is zero, the policy-maker only cares about
the probability of excess inﬂation and not about the extent to which inﬂation exceeds 2%.
These two cases correspond to the risk analysis undertaken in the previous section with its
focus on deﬂation and excess inﬂation probabilities. The larger the parameters a and b, the
more dissatisﬁed the policy-maker becomes as inﬂation exceeds the thresholds by a given
amount. Likewise, the parameters a and b may be regarded as the degree of risk aversion
on the part of a policy-maker who is concerned about deﬂation and excess inﬂation events.
For the assumed family of loss functions, a = 1 (b = 1) implies risk neutrality with respect
to deﬂation (excess inﬂation), risk-seeking behaviour is implied by values less than unity,
and risk averse behaviour follows from values greater than unity.
Formally, let L be the lower bound and U the upper bound for which the loss is zero
whenever inﬂation falls between L and U. With π denoting inﬂation, the downside risk
is measured as the expected loss of deﬂation given that inﬂation is below the threshold L
times the probability that this event occurs,
DR(L,a) = −E[(L − π)a|π < L] · Pr[π < L],
while the upside risk is measured as the expected loss of excess inﬂation given that inﬂation
is above the threshold U times the probability that this event occurs,
UR(U,b) = E[(π − U)b|π > U] · Pr[π > U].
9With the adopted convention of deﬁning downside risks as a negative number and upside
risks as a positive number, the overall expected loss is given by
E[Loss(L,U,a,b)] = −ω DR(L,a) + (1 − ω)UR(U,b),
where the parameter ω is the weight on downside risks relative to upside risks in the un-
derlying loss function.
Yet as pointed out by Kilian and Manganelli (2007), in a discussion of risks it seems
natural to focus on the distribution of the upside and downside risks, as opposed to the
overall extent of the risks. Recognising that the underlying loss function establishes a
link between the optimal level of inﬂation from the policy-maker’s point of view and the
distribution of risks, Kilian and Manganelli show that to this eﬀect a measure of the balance
of risks can be obtained under optimality arguments as a weighted average of the ﬁrst
derivatives of the quantiﬁed upside and downside risks with respect to inﬂation,16
RB(L,U,a,b) = ω aDR(L,a − 1) + (1 − ω)bUR(U,b − 1).
Accordingly, the balance of risks may remain unchanged even though both downside and
upside risks are assessed as having risen.17
In the following, the computation of all balance of risks measures will be based on the
assumption that the weight ω given to losses from deﬂation relative to losses from excess
inﬂation is equal to 0.5 (as was assumed in the construction of the graphs in Figure 2).
Benchmark results
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows the evolution of the balance of deﬂation and excess
inﬂation risks for the forecast vintages from December 2008 to December 2011 assuming
a quadratic loss function (a = b = 2).18 This balance of risk measure, normalised by its
steady-state value, will serve as our benchmark measure and is equal to the probability-
weighted sum of the mean of deﬂation and the mean of excess inﬂation conditional on the
events that annual inﬂation has been either below zero (L = 0) or above 2% (U = 2) for at
least 4 consecutive quarters (see the second and the fourth column in the table). A value
of zero therefore implies that upside and downside risks are balanced relative to the steady
16Kilian and Manganelli (2007) argue that changes in the balance of risk measure should trigger a policy
response. To the extent that we use the risk balance as a means for evaluating the evolution of risks to price
stability ex post, we do not pursue this idea further. See also the discussion in footnote 7.
17Notice that the risk balance measure is only deﬁned for risk aversion on the part of the policy-maker,
i.e. when a,b > 1.
18For an earlier application of balance of risk measures based on a quadratic loss function, see Smets and
Wouters (2004), who study the forecasting properties of a DSGE model for the euro area.
10state, while negative (positive) values imply that downside (upside) risks dominate. Ac-
cordingly, our benchmark risk balance measure suggests that downside risks were markedly
greater than upside risks for the March and June 2009 forecast vintages, followed by a
gradual re-balancing of these risks until summer 2011. Thereafter the risk balance turned
negative again on account of the worsening of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
The bottom line in Table 3 provides the values of the deﬂation and excess inﬂation
means based on the NAWM’s predictive distribution for inﬂation initialised in the model’s
steady state. The steady-state deﬂation mean of -1% is higher than the average mean of -2%
that is obtained for the predictive distributions of inﬂation associated with the 13 forecast
vintages from December 2008 to December 2011. By contrast, the average excess inﬂation
mean remains close to the steady-state value of 3.2%. Consequently, the steady-state risk
balance is higher than the risk balance measures for the individual forecast vintages, as
reﬂected in the negative values of the normalised risk balance measure in the ﬁrst column
of the table.
The evolution of the risk balance measure in Table 3 displays a pattern which is similar
to the pattern of the deﬂation and excess inﬂation probabilities in Table 1. This reﬂects the
fact that the time proﬁle of the risk balance is primarily determined by the time proﬁles
for the deﬂation and excess inﬂation probabilities. In particular, while the deﬂation mean
falls from -1.7% for the December 2008 forecast vintage to, on average, around -2% for the
forecast vintages in 2009, the deﬂation probability increases from around 4% to above 12.5%
on average. Furthermore, while the deﬂation probability diminishes from the September
2009 forecast vintage onwards, until the renewed deterioration in the second half of 2011,
the deﬂation mean remains relatively stable over this period, with some further, albeit
temporary declines in summer 2010 and autumn 2011 because of a stronger downward
skew of the predictive distributions for inﬂation on account of the heightened lower bound
incidence over these periods. This pattern contrasts with the ﬁnding that the excess inﬂation
mean stays fairly constant over all forecast vintages.
The third and the ﬁfth column in Table 3 show the variances of deﬂation and excess
inﬂation, conditional on the respective deﬂation and excess inﬂation events. These variances
form the basis for alternative measures of the risk balance that assume higher degrees of
risk aversion with respect to deﬂation and excess inﬂation events. We turn to such measures
in the next section. Here we note that the time proﬁle of the deﬂation variance resembles
closely the time proﬁle of the deﬂation mean, with elevated levels assumed in early 2009, mid
2010 and late 2011. The ﬂuctuations in the excess inﬂation variance are less pronounced,
11like for the excess inﬂation mean.
Sensitivity analysis
The benchmark risk balance measure which is used to determine the values reported in Ta-
ble 3 relies on particular upper and lower bounds deﬁning the deﬂation and excess inﬂation
events (L = 0, U = 2). Moreover, the benchmark measure is based on particular values for
the parameters that represent the degrees of risk aversion used to quantify the upside and
downside risks to price stability (a = b = 2). To study its robustness to changes in these
parameters, ﬁve alternative risk balance measures have been considered.
The ﬁndings from this sensitivity analysis are summarised in Table 4. First, the risk
balance measure is recomputed under the assumption that the bound deﬁning a deﬂation
event is increased from zero to 1% (L = 1), possibly reﬂecting some margin that accounts
for a bias in inﬂation measurement, while the bound for excess inﬂation remains at 2%.The
results are reported in the panel of the table titled “Higher deﬂation bound”.19 Second,
the bound deﬁning an excess inﬂation event is increased from 2% to 3% (U = 3), while the
deﬂation bound remains unchanged at zero. The corresponding panel is labelled by “Higher
inﬂation bound” and may manifest the view that the welfare costs of high inﬂation start
to materialise only at levels substantially above 2%. Third, the “Higher deﬂation aversion”
panel reﬂects a higher aversion to downside risks (a = 3), while the aversion to upside risks
remains equal to the benchmark case. Fourth, for the panel “Higher inﬂation aversion” the
aversion to upside risks is increased (b = 3), whereas the aversion to downside risks remains
unchanged. Finally, for the “Higher deﬂation and inﬂation aversion” panel, the aversion to
both downside and upside risks is proportionally increased (a = b = 3). The three cases
with higher deﬂation and/or inﬂation aversion are based on the bounds from the benchmark
case, i.e. with a deﬂation bound of zero and an excess inﬂation bound of 2%.
Overall, the changes to the risk balance measure do not qualitatively change the time
series pattern of the balance of deﬂation and excess inﬂation risks. In particular, treating
each measure as an index, all indices conﬁrm that deﬂation risks were most sizeable for the
March and June 2009 forecast vintages and that excess inﬂation risks have thereafter become
gradually more important before receding again in late 2011. The only measures that deviate
from this ﬁnding concern the two cases where the degree of deﬂation aversion is increased.
For the March and June 2010 vintages, these risk balance measures temporarily decrease
19Another reason for a higher deﬂation bound is the possibility that the risks associated with deﬂation may
materialise already at positive values for average inﬂation in a fragmented monetary union, where adverse
deﬂationary feedback loops occur at the level of a small group of member countries.
12further reﬂecting a large increase in the variance of deﬂation relative to the December 2009
vintage; see the third column in Table 3. The growing deﬂation variance is, as already noted
above, closely linked to the development of the lower bound incidence which increases from
17.7% in the December 2009 vintage to respectively 19.1% and 24.7% in the March and
June 2010 vintages; see the far right column in Table 1.
4 Risks to price stability and forward guidance
Once interest rates are approaching their lower bound, diﬀerent non-standard monetary pol-
icy measures can be implemented. Amongst these non-standard measures, forward guidance
regarding the path of future short-term nominal interest rates amounts to a commitment
on the part of the monetary policy-maker to keep nominal interest rates low for longer to
ensure a faster return of the economy to macroeconomic stability. The theoretical underpin-
nings of forward guidance are well understood: It revolves around the idea of inﬂuencing the
private sector’s interest rate and inﬂation expectations in an attempt to provide additional
stimulus to the economy through lower expected future real interest rates.20
Typically, studies have analysed the eﬀects of forward guidance once short-term nominal
interest rates have reached the zero lower bound following a sequence of recessionary shocks
and often in a deterministic setting.21 Here, we again employ stochastic simulations using
the NAWM to illustrate that the anticipation of the provision of forward guidance in the
future can already be conducive to mitigating risks to price stability even though the interest
rate has not yet fully reached the zero lower bound. This is arguably the situation in the euro
area over our evaluation period. The potency of the mere possibility of forward guidance
reﬂects the fact that private sector’s expectations incorporate the knowledge that the scope
for future cuts in nominal interest rates is limited once they are close to zero, without having
necessarily reached the zero lower bound today.
Time-based forward guidance
Table 5 provides an illustration of the possible eﬀects of providing forward guidance con-
cerning the future path of the short-term nominal interest rate against the background of
the economic conditions that prevailed in December 2011.22 First, we recall as a point of
20See, among others, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006), Nakov (2008), Walsh
(2009) and Woodford (2012).
21For a discussion of possible limitations on the eﬀectiveness of forward guidance following severe recessions
see Levin, L´ opez-Salido, Nelson and Yun (2010).
22While the ECB had refrained from providing forward guidance during the period evaluated in this paper,
it implemented a number of other non-standard measures; see footnote 3. In our analysis we do not explicitly
13reference the results of the NAWM-based real-time assessment of risks to price stability.
When comparing the deﬂation and excess inﬂation risks for this forecast vintage to those
obtained from the model’s steady-state distribution, it can be seen that the deﬂation risk
exceeds the steady-state value by about 5 percentage points, while the excess inﬂation risk
stays below the steady-state value by a somewhat smaller extent. The (benchmark) risk
balance measure is tilted to the downside and stands at -0.7.
An important factor in explaining the negative risk balance is the heightened value of
the lower-bound incidence which amounts to 29.0%, compared with 0.3% for the model’s
steady-state distribution. This record-high value of the lower-bound incidence reﬂects the
historically low level of short-term nominal interest rates that markets expected to prevail
over the horizon of the December 2011 forecast vintage. It implies that monetary policy
is likely to be increasingly often constrained in its ability to oﬀset any further recessionary
and deﬂationary shocks that may occur over the forecast horizon by adjusting its interest
rate instrument.
In the stochastic simulations underlying the results in Table 5, forward guidance is
implemented as a conditional commitment by the monetary policy-maker to keep the short-
term nominal interest rate low for longer than prescribed by the NAWM’s estimated policy
rule in situations where the interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound. Speciﬁcally,
the conditional commitment is time-based and foresees to keep the short-term nominal
interest rate at the lower bound for a certain number of additional quarters, over and
above the number of quarters for which the interest rate is constrained in the absence of the
conditional commitment, whenever the lower bound constraint is binding. This commitment
is revisited each quarter upon the arrival of new shocks.23
As shown in Table 5, incrementally increasing the number of additional quarters over
which the interest rate is expected to remain at the lower bound—from the reference case
with no commitment to the cases with a 1 and a 2-quarter conditional commitment—
succeeds in tilting the risk balance upwards to -0.6 and -0.3, respectively. Interestingly,
if the commitment is extended further to 3 quarters, the risk balance turns positive by
a sizeable extent. In particular, lengthening the duration of the commitment beyond 2
consider those measures, or anticipations thereof, but rather assume that they are reﬂected in the baseline
forecast path around which we conduct the model-based simulations.
23On the whole, the proposed conditional commitment to keep the interest rate low for a certain number of
additional quarters seems more easy to implement in practice than a proposal by Reifschneider and Williams
(2000), which features a conditional commitment to undo the (unobservable) interest rate gap corresponding
to the cumulated short-fall of the notional interest rate prescribed by an interest rate rule without having
imposed the lower bound constraint from the interest rate which respects the constraint.
14quarters has such a strong impact on the economy that inﬂationary pressures emerge, with
the probability of excess inﬂation exceeding 40%. This value is signiﬁcantly higher than the
steady-state probability of around 29%. Notice that the incidence of the short-term interest
rate hitting the lower bound turns out to be somewhat lower ex post.
Figure 3 shows the mean and the 70% and 90% conﬁdence bands of the NAWM-based
predictive distributions of consumer price inﬂation and real GDP growth for the December
2011 forecast vintage, both for the reference case with no and for the three cases with the
1, 2 and 3-quarter conditional commitment. In the case with no conditional commitment,
the distributions are markedly skewed to the downside from the middle of 2012 onwards.
Accordingly, their means depart from the baseline paths and lie increasingly below the latter
over the outer years of the forecast horizon. As already anticipated above, this is due to
the fact that the reaction of monetary policy to new recessionary and deﬂationary shocks
over the forecast horizon is more and more often constrained by the zero lower bound. By
contrast, in the cases with the 1, 2 and 3-quarter conditional commitment the distributions
for consumer price inﬂation and real GDP growth are progressively shifted upward, with
their means broadly aligned with the baseline forecast under the 2-quarter commitment
and increasingly exceeding the baseline under the 3-quarter commitment. As regards the
predictive distribution for the short-term nominal interest rate, the diﬀerences between the
no-commitment case and the 1, 2 and 3-quarter commitment cases are hardly noticeable,
and thus the respective distributions are not displayed.
Table 6 reports the mean eﬀects of the conditional commitment to keep the interest
rate low for longer. They are computed as the deviation from the mean of the predictive
distributions for the December 2011 baseline forecast with no commitment. It can be seen
that the eﬀect of the conditional commitment of keeping the interest rate at the lower bound
for longer is increasing non-linearly with the duration of the commitment. For example, the
incremental eﬀect of lengthening the duration of the commitment from 2 to 3 quarters on the
mean of inﬂation in 2013 amounts to 1.2 percentage points, compared to a 0.4 percentage-
point eﬀect of extending the commitment from 1 to 2 quarters.24 The key factor behind
this result is the acceleration in the build-up of (excess) inﬂation expectations, measured
here by the model-based forecast of the annualised average inﬂation rate 2 years ahead.
By contrast, nominal interest rate expectations, computed on the basis of a term-structure
24Relevant to this ﬁnding, Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2012) show that in prototype New Keynesian
models pegging the short-term nominal interest rate—tantamount to credibly announcing that it will remain
at the zero lower bound for longer—can result in responses of macroeconomic variables that are surprisingly
large if the horizon of the peg is extended beyond a few quarters.
15relationship extending 2 years into the future, are virtually unaﬀected. The reason is that
current as well as expected future short-term interest rates are endogenous variables which
adjust to the improved outlook, including for inﬂation, that results from the provision of
forward guidance. In equilibrium, the endogenous adjustment of interest rates oﬀsets, on
average, the ex-ante eﬀect from the conditional commitment to keep interest rates low for
longer.25 In fact, with an improved outlook there may actually be shorter spells with the
interest rate being at the lower bound, or even fewer instances where the policy-maker needs
to commit to keep interest rates at the lower bound for longer.26 This is consistent with
the above observations that the lower bound incidence under the conditional commitment
moderately falls and that the shape of the predictive distribution of the short-term interest
rate is hardly aﬀected.
Time-cum-threshold-based forward guidance
The above ﬁndings suggest that, for practical policy-making purposes, it will be important
to carefully calibrate the length of the horizon over which forward guidance is provided.
Indeed, if mechanically applied, forward guidance in the form of a purely time-based com-
mitment to keep interest rates low over an extended horizon may—through its impact on
inﬂation expectations—create higher inﬂationary momentum than desired, eventually lead-
ing to upside risk to price stability over the medium term.
By way of illustration, Table 7 shows the results of model-based stochastic simulations
that have been designed so as to prevent the materialisation of such upside risk. Speciﬁcally,
in these simulations the pure time-based conditional commitment is augmented with a
threshold condition of 2% for the average 2-year-ahead inﬂation forecast generated by the
model in each quarter. This time-cum-threshold-based conditional commitment foresees
to keep the short-term nominal interest rate at the lower bound for a certain number of
additional quarters, over and above the number of quarters in the absence of the conditional
commitment, whenever the interest rate is constrained by the lower bound and the current
inﬂation forecast does not exceed the threshold value of 2%. In case the inﬂation threshold
is crossed, the number of additional quarters over which the interest rate is kept at the
25By contrast, using deterministic simulations with an estimated medium-size New Keynesian model like
the NAWM, Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2012) explain the extreme sensitivity of the macro outcomes
to keeping the short-term nominal interest rate at the lower bound for longer by the model’s tendency to
predict an excessive response of the long-term nominal interest rate, compared to what has been measured
in the data following, e.g., statements on forward guidance by the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market
Committee. In a deterministic setting, this feature is also observed for the NAWM.
26For the cases with the 1, 2 and 3-quarter conditional commitment, the expected average length of the
zero lower bound spells—including the number of additional quarters over which the interest rate is expected
to remain at the lower bound—equals 5.2, 6.2 and 6.8 quarters, respectively.
16lower bound is successively reduced until the threshold condition is met.
Whereas the results under the threshold-augmented conditional commitment in Table 7
do not diﬀer materially from the results under the pure time-based conditional commitment
in Table 5 when the interest rate remains at the lower bound for 1 or 2 additional quarters,
the results change signiﬁcantly for the 3-quarter conditional commitment case. For the
time-cum-threshold-based commitment, the increase in the (excess) inﬂation risk is now
contained and exceeds its steady-state value of around 29% by merely a small amount,
whereas the deﬂation risk is signiﬁcantly reduced, even slightly below the steady-state value
of about 1%.27 The risk balance turns out to be virtually zero.28
These striking ﬁndings are also evident from the shape of the predictive distributions
for consumer price inﬂation under the two types of conditional commitment, which are
depicted in the upper panels of Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. In particular, for the
3-quarter conditional commitment cum threshold, the mean of the distribution lies just
slightly above the Consensus baseline, with the sizeable upward bias under the pure time-
based commitment having virtually disappeared. This in turn reﬂects a much more benign
impact on medium-term inﬂation expectations.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the evolution of the risks to price stability in the euro area
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. To this end, we have employed model-based stochastic
simulations to characterise the profound uncertainties and risks that surrounded the outlook
for inﬂation in the euro area in real time. A formal measure of the balance of risks, which is
based on policy-makers’ preferences about inﬂation outcomes and takes the severity of the
prevailing risks into account, suggests that downside risks to price stability were considerably
greater than upside risks during the ﬁrst half of 2009. After a drawn-out rebalancing of
risks, the risk balance started to turn negative again in the second half of 2011 due to
the re-intensiﬁcation of the crisis on account of elevated tensions in euro area sovereign
debt markets. Our analysis demonstrates that the lower bound on nominal interest rates
27For the 3-quarter commitment case, out of the total number of instances where the zero bound con-
straint is binding and the monetary policy-maker considers to provide forward guidance, the horizon of
the commitment to keep the interest rate at the lower bound is reduced to 2 quarters in 31.7% of all in-
stances, to 1 quarter in 1.6% of all instances, and in 0.6% of the instances no forward guidance is oﬀered.
For the 2 and 1-quarter commitment cases, the fraction of instances with reduced commitment horizon is
disproportionately smaller.
28The risk balance does not turn positive as the mean of the deﬂation event is still more negative than in
steady state.
17has induced a noticeable downward bias in the risk balance throughout the crisis period
because of the implied ampliﬁcation of deﬂation risks.
While our analysis of the evolution of risks to price stability oﬀers a narrative of the
consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis for the euro area inﬂation outlook in real time, the
employed methodology of stochastic simulations has also been used to illustrate the eﬀects
of counterfactual policy measures. In particular, we have examined the eﬀectiveness of
providing forward guidance concerning the path of future short-term nominal interest rates
as a means to delivering additional stimulus in a situation where nominal interest rates are
close to zero and where downside risks to price stability prevail. We show that a time-based
form of forward guidance, which foresees to keep the interest rate at the zero lower bound
for a certain number of additional quarters, imparts the intended stimulus and is successful
in reducing the prevailing downside risks. Yet if extended too far into the future, it may,
through its impact on inﬂation expectations, give rise to upside risks to price stability over
the medium term. We demonstrate that complementing the time-based variant of forward
guidance with a threshold condition concerning tolerable future inﬂation developments can
provide insurance against the materialisation of such upside risks.
We conclude by arguing that the model-based measure of the balance of risks to price
stability studied in this paper is a valuable tool for characterising the general uncertainties
and risks surrounding any given baseline forecast, over and above the use of model-based
scenario analyses that highlight the consequences of speciﬁc shocks and events over the
forecast horizon. Moreover, to the extent that the balance of risk measure is derived from
the preferences of policy-makers that are concerned about inﬂation outcomes, it establishes
a link between desirable levels of inﬂation from the policy-makers’ point of view and the
balance of upside and downside risks to price stability. Accordingly, the risk measure it-
self may serve as a guidepost for policy-making, including in situations where short-term
nominal interest rates are close to the zero lower bound.
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21Appendix A: The New Area-Wide Model
The New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) is a micro-founded open-economy model of the euro
area designed for use in the ECB/Eurosystem staﬀ projections and for policy analysis; see
Christoﬀel, Coenen and Warne (2008) for a detailed description. The development of the
model has been guided by a principal consideration, namely to provide a comprehensive set
of core projection variables, including a number of foreign variables, which, in the form of
exogenous assumptions, play an important role in the staﬀ projections. As a consequence,
the size of the NAWM—compared with the well-known Smets and Wouters (2007) model—is
rather large, and it is estimated on 18 macroeconomic time series.
The NAWM features four classes of economic agents: households, ﬁrms, a ﬁscal authority
and a monetary authority. Households make optimal choices regarding their purchases of
consumption and investment goods, the latter determining the economy-wide capital stock.
They supply diﬀerentiated labour services in monopolistically competitive markets, they
set wages as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, and they trade in domestic and foreign bonds.
As regards ﬁrms, the NAWM distinguishes between domestic producers of tradable in-
termediate goods and domestic producers of three types of non-tradable ﬁnal goods: a
private consumption good, a private investment good, and a public consumption good. The
intermediate-good ﬁrms use labour and capital services as inputs to produce diﬀerentiated
goods, which are sold in monopolistically competitive markets domestically and abroad.
Accordingly, they set diﬀerent prices for domestic and foreign markets as a mark-up over
their marginal costs. The ﬁnal-good ﬁrms combine domestic and foreign intermediate goods
in diﬀerent proportions, acting as price takers in fully competitive markets. The foreign
intermediate goods are imported from producers abroad, who set their prices in euro in mo-
nopolistically competitive markets, allowing for an incomplete exchange-rate pass-through.
A foreign retail ﬁrm in turn combines the exported domestic intermediate goods, where
aggregate export demand depends on total foreign demand.
Both households and ﬁrms face nominal and real frictions, which have been identiﬁed
as important in generating empirically plausible dynamics. Real frictions are introduced
via external habit formation in consumption, through generalised adjustment costs in in-
vestment, imports and exports, and through ﬁxed cost in intermediate goods production.
Nominal frictions arise from staggered price and wage-setting ` a la Calvo, along with (partial)
dynamic indexation of price and wage contracts. In addition, there exist ﬁnancial frictions
in the form of domestic and external risk premia that enter the model as exogenous shocks.
The domestic risk premium is interpretable as a ﬁnancial intermediation premium.29
29The historical decomposition of the NAWM’s observed variables into its structural shocks reveals that
the domestic risk premium shock is amongst the most important shocks explaining the sharp drop in real
GDP at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. Moreover, the domestic risk premium shock is found to capture
the adverse economic consequences of the sovereign debt crisis in the years 2010 and 2011 that resulted in
a surge in sovereign yields and private sector ﬁnancing costs.
22The ﬁscal authority purchases the public consumption good, issues domestic bonds,
and levies diﬀerent types of distortionary taxes. Nevertheless, Ricardian equivalence holds
because of the simplifying assumption that the ﬁscal authority’s budget is balanced each
period by means of lump-sum taxes. The monetary authority sets the short-term nominal
interest rate according to a simple log-linear rule,
b rt = φR b rt−1 + (1 − φR)φΠb πC,t−1 + φ∆Π (b πC,t − b πC,t−1) + φ∆Y (b yt − b yt−1) + b ηR
t ,
where b rt is the logarithmic deviation of the (gross) nominal interest rate from its steady-
state value. Similarly, b πC,t denotes the logarithmic deviation of (gross) quarter-on-quarter
consumer price inﬂation ΠC,t from the monetary authority’s inﬂation objective ¯ Π, while b yt
is the logarithmic deviation of aggregate output from the trend output level. b ηR
t is a serially
uncorrelated shock to the nominal interest rate.
Finally, the NAWM is closed by a rest-of-the-world block, which is represented by an
SVAR model determining a small set of foreign variables: foreign demand, foreign prices,
the foreign interest rate, foreign competitors’ export prices and the price of oil. The SVAR
model does not feature spill-overs from the euro area, in line with the treatment of the
foreign variables as exogenous assumptions in the staﬀ projections.
The NAWM has been estimated with Bayesian methods and using times series for 18
macroeconomic variables which feature prominently in the projections: real GDP, private
consumption, total investment, government consumption, extra-euro area exports and im-
ports, the GDP deﬂator, the consumption deﬂator, the extra-euro area import deﬂator, total
employment, nominal wages per head, the short-term nominal interest rate, the nominal
eﬀective exchange rate, foreign demand, foreign prices, the foreign interest rate, competitors
export prices, and the price of oil. The estimation sample period ranges from 1985Q1 to
2006Q4 (using the period 1980Q2 to 1984Q4 as training sample). The estimation involves
obtaining the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters based on its state-space rep-
resentation using the Kalman ﬁlter.30
Appendix B: Construction of baseline forecasts
The forecast vintages are dated December 2008 until December 2011 and they have been
constructed by combining the quarterly Area-Wide Model (AWM) database maintained
at the ECB with the quarterly Consensus Forecasts (CF) vintages released by Consensus
Economics. The AWM database is updated annually with a cut-oﬀ date for a new update
in early August each year. Each annual update contains euro area data up to Q4 for the
previous year. The CF vintages are updated quarterly.
30For the estimation of the NAWM, we have used YADA, a MATLAB programme for Bayesian estimation
and evaluation of DSGE models; see Warne (2012).
23The historical data for the constructed quarterly forecast vintages are all based on the
AWM database updates. Therefore they only reﬂect annual revisions. The historical data
in the CF vintages from September and December of a given year contain data for Q3 and
Q4 of real GDP, real private consumption, and consumer prices for the previous year. Since
these data are more recent than the AWM data available at the same point in time, the
CF data are used in the September and December forecast vintages. For all CF vintages
further historical data and forecasts are provided for these variables up to a total of 12
quarters. This means that the September and December vintages have such data from Q3
of the previous year until Q2 two years ahead. E.g., for the December 2008 CF vintage the
forecast data cover the sample 2008Q3-2010Q2. For the March and June vintages the CF
data cover Q1 for the previous year until Q4 for the next year.
The ﬁrst quarter of the ECB/Eurosystem staﬀ projections is given by the projec-
tion/vintage date (e.g., 2008Q4 for the December 2008 projection exercise), while the ﬁnal
quarter of the projections is always Q4 two years ahead.31 This means that there are 12
projection quarters for the March vintage, 11 for the June vintage, 10 for the September
vintage, and 9 for the December vintage. The forecast vintages in this paper use the same
horizon as the staﬀ projections. Compared with the end date for the ECB staﬀ projections,
this means that the March and June CF vintages have missing data in the last four quarters
of the forecast sample, while the September and December vintages have missing data in
the last two quarters of the forecast sample.
Furthermore, the AWM database series for the short-term nominal interest rate (cor-
responding to the EURIBOR) has been extended to the end of the forecast horizon by
applying the methodology used by ECB/Eurosystem staﬀ, with market expectations de-
rived from futures rates (see, e.g., ECB, 2012) and using a cut-oﬀ date aligned with the
survey date of the CF vintage. The EONIA forecasts have likewise been calculated using a
similar methodology based on swap rates.
For real GDP and real private consumption quarterly growth rates are provided in the
CF vintages and these rates have been applied to the levels data from the AWM database
to obtain CF consistent levels data for these two variables. The missing data for real GDP
and private consumption have been estimated by applying an ARIMA(0,1,1) model with a
constant to the log-levels of these variables. For consumer prices the CF vintages provide
only annual growth rates. These annual rates have been applied to the HICP variable of the
AWM database. The resulting HICP series is likewise extended using an ARIMA(0,4,1,)
model with a constant for the log-levels and accounting for seasonality. The resulting growth
rates have been applied to extend the series for the private consumption deﬂator over the
historical and the forecast sample.
31Even though the staﬀ prepares quarterly projections until Q4 two years ahead, the ECB only publishes, in
the form of ranges, annual projections of a restricted set of variables for the current year and one year ahead,
except for the publication of the December projection exercises which cover two-year ahead projections.
24For the remaining variables of the NAWM there are historical data for each forecast
vintage until the end of the year prior to the vintage date for the September and the
December vintages, and until the end of two years prior to the vintage date for the March
and June vintages. For example, for the December 2009 vintage there are AWM data on
wages until 2008Q4. This means that there are missing data for the historical sample (up
to 2009Q3). Rather than treating these data points as missing in the assessments of risks
to price stability, the missing data are replaced with estimates via the Kalman smoother
based on the state-space representation of the NAWM and using only the historical sample
of the forecast vintage.
Appendix C: Solution and simulation methods
In preparation for the stochastic simulations, we ﬁrst computed for each baseline forecast
vintage the structural shocks and the state variables of the NAWM for the historical sample
extended with the baseline forecast. Since the non-negativity constraint for nominal interest
rates was never binding in the extended sample, we obtained the structural shocks and states
by solving the NAWM for its reduced form using the AIM implementation (Anderson and
Moore, 1985, and Anderson, 1987) of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method for solving
linear rational expectations models and by applying the Kalman ﬁlter to its (log-)linear
state-space representation.
Based on the population covariance matrix of the structural shocks and the conditional
covariance matrix of the states at the origin of the baseline forecast horizon, we then gener-
ated for each forecast vintage 5,000 sequences of artiﬁcial normally-distributed shocks with
a sample length corresponding to the baseline forecast horizon and 5,000 realisations of
the states.32 We added the sequences of the artiﬁcial shocks (except for the shocks to the
NAWM’s interest rate rule which we set to zero) to the sequence of shocks computed over
the baseline forecast horizon and used the resulting sequences of shocks to conduct stochas-
tic simulations, while imposing the zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates.33
If it were not for this non-linearity, we could use the linear state-space representation of
the NAWM to compute the predictive distributions of the endogenous variables of interest
without having to resort to stochastic simulations.
32That is, we restrict our analysis to a ﬁxed set of parameters, namely the posterior mode estimates of
the NAWM’s structural parameters. Accounting for parameter uncertainty by drawing from the posterior
distribution of the structural parameters would have been computationally too burdensome.
33To ensure stability of the model in the presence of the zero lower bound constraint, ﬁscal policy is
assumed to boost aggregate demand to rescue the economy from falling into a deﬂationary spiral, if deﬂation
becomes so severe that the lower bound restricts the real interest rate at a level high enough to induce a
growing aggregate demand imbalance. An alternative approach to ensuring stability is to concentrate on
other channels of the monetary transmission mechanism that may continue to operate even when the interest
rate channel is ineﬀective. E.g., Orphanides and Wieland (2000) concentrate on the aggressive expansion
of the monetary base during episodes of zero interest rates to exploit direct quantity eﬀects such as a
portfolio-balance eﬀect.
25We simulate the non-linear model using a computationally eﬃcient algorithm which
is implemented in TROLL and based on work by Laﬀargue (1990), Juillard (1994) and
Boucekkine (1995).34 It is related to the Fair and Taylor (1983) extended-path algorithm.
In the simulations, the lower bound constraint also applies to the expectations of future
interest rates. A limitation of the algorithm is that the expectations of economic agents
are computed under the counterfactual assumption that certainty equivalence holds in the
non-linear model being simulated. This means, when solving for the dynamic path of the
endogenous variables from a given period onwards, the algorithm sets future shocks equal
to their expected value of zero. Thus the variance of future shocks has no bearing on the
formation of expectations and, hence, on current conditions. This would be correct in a
linear model. However once we introduce the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
into the model, the variance of future shocks introduces a small bias in the average levels
of various variables, including importantly, interest rates. To be clear, we should emphasise
that the variance of shocks has both a direct and an indirect eﬀect on the results. The
direct eﬀect is that a greater variance of shocks implies that the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates binds with greater frequency, the indirect eﬀect is that all agents
should be taking this eﬀect of the variance into account when they form their expectations.
The simulation algorithm captures the direct eﬀect but not the indirect one.
There are other solution algorithms for non-linear rational expectations models that do
not impose certainty equivalence. But these alternative algorithms would be prohibitively
costly to use with the NAWM, which has more than eighty state variables. Even with the
algorithm we are using, stochastic analysis of non-linear rational expectations models with
a large number of state variables remains fairly costly in terms of computational eﬀort.
34TROLL is an integrated econometric modelling and time series management tool used by many central
banks and international organisations.
26Table 1: Gauging risks to price stability and the lower bound incidence.
Risks to price stability Lower bound
Deﬂation Excess inﬂation incidence
December ’08 4.4 15.3 6.0
March ’09 13.9 11.6 15.9
June ’09 14.8 9.8 11.0
September ’09 12.2 10.1 16.5
December ’09 9.2 9.3 17.7
March ’10 11.1 12.9 19.1
June ’10 10.5 15.8 24.7
September ’10 8.0 18.8 22.4
December ’10 5.6 19.8 19.0
March ’11 4.2 30.7 8.1
June ’11 3.6 33.5 9.2
September ’11 7.3 23.9 25.2
December ’11 6.8 24.6 29.0
Steady state 1.5 28.7 0.3
Note: This table shows the evolution of risks to price stability and of the importance of the lower bound
constraint for short-term nominal interest rates over the period from December ’08 to December ’11. The
deﬂation (excess inﬂation) risk corresponds to the probability of annual inﬂation being below zero (above
2%) for at least 4 consecutive quarters, expressed in percent. The lower bound incidence is equal to the
probability that the short-term nominal interest rate is constrained by its lower bound, in percent. The
risk measures and the lower bound incidence are based on the NAWM’s predictive distributions for annual
inﬂation and the short-term nominal interest rate which have been constructed around successive Consensus
forecast vintages. In the computations, the short-term nominal interest rate corresponds to the 3-month
EURIBOR. The lower bound constraint is imposed at interest rate levels between 30 and 70 basis points,
reﬂecting the average spread between the EURIBOR and the EONIA over the horizon of the respective
Consensus forecast vintage. The steady-state values are calculated from the predictive distributions for
inﬂation and the nominal interest rate initialised at the model’s steady state and expressed as averages
over the diﬀerent lengths of the forecast horizons within a calendar year.
27Table 2: Gauging risks to price stability and the lower bound incidence in 2011.
Risks to price stability Lower bound
Deﬂation Excess inﬂation incidence
March ’09 16.3 18.8 11.9
June ’09 14.8 15.7 6.5
September ’09 14.0 15.4 10.8
December ’09 12.5 12.9 11.8
March ’10 9.7 10.9 18.3
June ’10 4.3 13.3 28.0
September ’10 1.2 19.2 25.0
December ’10 0.1 19.1 21.2
March ’11 0.0 48.4 7.4
Note: This table shows the evolution of risks to price stability and of the importance of the lower bound
constraint for a particular calendar year, namely 2011, as obtained from the predictive distributions for
annual inﬂation and the short-term nominal interest rate constructed around successive Consensus forecast
vintages. See Table 1 for further details.
28Table 3: The balance of risks to price stability and additional risk measures.
Risk balance Deﬂation risk Excess inﬂation risk
[L=0;U=2;a=2;b=2] Mean Variance Mean Variance
December ’08 -0.7 -1.7 2.9 3.1 0.7
March ’09 -1.6 -2.5 6.4 3.3 0.7
June ’09 -1.5 -1.9 3.7 3.2 0.6
September ’09 -1.3 -1.8 2.9 3.2 0.7
December ’09 -1.2 -1.9 2.7 3.0 0.6
March ’10 -1.3 -2.2 4.0 3.2 0.7
June ’10 -1.3 -2.6 5.5 3.2 0.6
September ’10 -1.0 -2.4 3.9 3.1 0.6
December ’10 -0.7 -1.9 2.7 3.0 0.6
March ’11 -0.2 -1.8 2.3 3.2 0.7
June ’11 0.0 -1.9 2.8 3.2 0.6
September ’11 -0.7 -2.4 4.2 3.1 0.5
December ’11 -0.7 -2.3 3.8 3.1 0.5
Steady state 0.0 -1.0 0.5 3.2 0.7
Note: This table shows the evolution of the balance of risks to price stability and of related risk measures
over the period from December ’08 to December ’11. The risk balance is calculated from the predictive
distribution of annual inﬂation as the probability-weighted mean of deﬂation and excess inﬂation, condi-
tional on the respective deﬂation and excess inﬂation event, and expressed as the percentage deviation
from its steady-state value. The upper and lower bounds deﬁning the deﬂation and excess inﬂation events
(L and U) are zero and 2%, respectively. The degrees of risk aversion assumed to quantify the deﬂation
and excess inﬂation risks (a and b) are equal to 2, corresponding to a quadratic loss function on the part of
the policy-maker. The steady-state means and variances are calculated from the predictive distribution of
annual inﬂation initialised at the model’s steady state, conditional on the event of interest, and expressed
as averages over the diﬀerent lengths of the forecast horizons.
29Table 4: The sensitivity of the balance of risks to price stability.
Benchmark Higher deﬂation Higher inﬂation
bound bound
[L=0;U=2;a=2;b=2] [L=1;U=2;a=2;b=2] [L=0;U=3;a=2;b=2]
December ’08 -0.7 -1.2 -1.9
March ’09 -1.6 -3.3 -5.9
June ’09 -1.5 -3.1 -5.3
September ’09 -1.3 -2.8 -4.5
December ’09 -1.2 -2.6 -4.1
March ’10 -1.3 -2.6 -4.3
June ’10 -1.3 -2.4 -4.9
September ’10 -1.0 -1.8 -3.7
December ’10 -0.7 -1.3 -2.5
March ’11 -0.2 -0.3 -0.9
June ’11 0.0 -0.1 -0.6
September ’11 -0.7 -1.4 -3.2
December ’11 -0.7 -1.3 -3.2
Higher deﬂation Higher inﬂation Higher deﬂation and
aversion aversion inﬂation aversion
[L=0;U=2;a=3;b=2] [L=0;U=2;a=2;b=3] [L=0;U=2;a=3;b=3]
December ’08 -1.8 -0.5 -0.9
March ’09 -9.2 -0.9 -3.4
June ’09 -5.9 -1.0 -2.5
September ’09 -4.4 -0.9 -2.0
December ’09 -3.6 -0.9 -1.8
March ’10 -5.3 -0.8 -2.1
June ’10 -6.7 -0.8 -2.6
September ’10 -4.0 -0.6 -1.7
December ’10 -2.1 -0.5 -1.1
March ’11 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4
June ’11 -0.8 0.1 -0.2
September ’11 -3.8 -0.5 -1.5
December ’11 -3.3 -0.5 -1.4
Note: See Table 3. The benchmark case is computed from a deﬂation bound (L) of zero and an excess
inﬂation bound (U) of 2%, with deﬂation and inﬂation aversion parameters (a and b) equal to 2. When the
deﬂation (excess inﬂation) bound is higher, it is equal to 1% (3%). The cases with higher deﬂation and/or
inﬂation aversion are based on increasing one or both of the aversion parameters from 2 to 3.Table 5: Gauging risks to price stability under a time-based conditional commitment to
keep nominal interest rates low for longer, December ’11.
Risks to price stability
Risk balance Lower bound
Deﬂation Excess inﬂation incidence
December ’11 6.8 24.6 -0.7 29.0
Interest rate kept at lower bound for:
1 additional quarter 6.1 25.0 -0.6 28.9
2 additional quarters 3.4 27.1 -0.3 28.3
3 additional quarters 0.1 41.2 0.9 26.2
Steady state 1.5 28.7 0.0 0.3
Note: The time-based conditional commitment foresees to keep the short-term nominal interest rate at
the lower bound for a certain number of additional quarters, over and above the number of quarters in
the absence of the conditional commitment, whenever the interest rate is constrained by the lower bound.
The latter is imposed at an interest rate level of 60 basis points, reﬂecting the average spread between the
EURIBOR and the EONIA over the horizon of the December ’11 forecast vintage. See Tables 1 and 3 for
details on the measures reported in the table.
31Table 6: Assessing the mean eﬀects of a time-based conditional commitment to keep nominal
interest rates low for longer, December ’11.
Consumer price inﬂation Real GDP growth
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Interest rate kept at lower bound for:
1 additional quarter 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
2 additional quarters 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.7
3 additional quarters 0.0 0.5 1.7 0.0 1.7 2.1
2-year nominal interest rate 2-year inﬂation expectations
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Interest rate kept at lower bound for:
1 additional quarter -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
2 additional quarters -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4
3 additional quarters -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.4
Note: See Table 5. The mean eﬀects represent the deviations from the means of the distributions for the
December ’11 forecast vintage, expressed in percentage points.
32Table 7: Gauging risks to price stability under a time-cum-threshold-based conditional
commitment to keep nominal interest rates low for longer, December ’11.
Risks to price stability
Risk balance Lower bound
Deﬂation Excess inﬂation incidence
December ’11 6.8 24.6 -0.7 29.0
Interest rate kept at lower bound for a maximum period of:
1 additional quarter 6.2 24.9 -0.6 28.9
2 additional quarters 3.6 26.8 -0.3 28.4
3 additional quarters 1.1 31.0 -0.0 28.0
Steady state 1.5 28.7 0.0 0.3
Note: The time-cum-threshold-based conditional commitment foresees to keep the short-term nominal
interest rate at the lower bound for a certain number of additional quarters, over and above the number
of quarters in the absence of the conditional commitment, whenever the interest rate is constrained by
the lower bound and the threshold of 2% for the annualised average 2-year-ahead inﬂation forecast is
not exceeded. In case the threshold value is exceeded, the number of additional quarters over which the
interest rate is kept at the lower bound is successively reduced until the threshold is met. The lower bound
is imposed at an interest rate level of 60 basis points, reﬂecting the average spread between the EURIBOR
and the EONIA over the horizon of the December ’11 forecast vintage. See Tables 1 and 3 for details on
the measures reported in the table.
33Table A: Gauging risks to price stability and the lower bound incidence over a uniform
9-quarter horizon.
Risks to price stability Lower bound
Deﬂation Excess inﬂation incidence
December ’08 4.4 15.3 6.0
March ’09 12.5 8.0 17.4
June ’09 14.8 7.6 12.2
September ’09 11.7 8.9 17.5
December ’09 9.2 9.3 17.7
March ’10 8.9 10.1 21.7
June ’10 7.9 14.8 26.0
September ’10 6.7 18.7 22.6
December ’10 5.6 19.8 19.0
March ’11 2.5 32.9 8.3
June ’11 2.3 35.1 9.0
September ’11 5.7 24.5 25.2
December ’11 6.8 24.6 29.0
Steady state 1.1 28.3 0.2
Note: See Table 1. The steady-state values are calculated from the predictive distributions for annual
inﬂation and the short-term nominal interest rate initialised at the model’s steady state and evaluated over
a 9-quarter horizon.
34Figure 1: Predictive distributions for consumer price inﬂation, real GDP growth and the
short-term nominal interest rate, March ’09.
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Note: The predictive distributions are derived from stochastic simulations of the NAWM and are centred on
the structural shocks that the model has identiﬁed for the March ’09 Consensus forecast vintage. Consumer
price inﬂation and real GDP growth are expressed in annual terms. The short-term nominal interest rate in
the NAWM corresponds to the annualised 3-month EURIBOR. The lower bound is imposed at an interest
rate level of 65 basis points, reﬂecting the average spread between the EURIBOR and the EONIA over the
horizon of the forecast vintage.
35Figure 2: Loss functions for alternative inﬂation preferences.
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Note: The parametric family of loss functions depicts the preferences of a policy-maker regarding alternative
inﬂation outcomes, with a zone of indiﬀerence deﬁned by a lower bound of zero and an upper bound of 2%.
36Figure 3: Predictive distributions for consumer price inﬂation and real GDP growth under
a time-based conditional commitment, December ’11.
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Note: See Figure 1 and Table 5.
37Figure 4: Predictive distributions for consumer price inﬂation and real GDP growth under
a time-cum-threshold-based conditional commitment, December ’11.
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Note: See Figure 1 and Table 7.
38Figure A: Predictive distributions for consumer price inﬂation, real GDP growth and the
short-term nominal interest rate, December ’08 to December ’11.
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
 
’
0
8
Consumer price inflation
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Consensus
Mean
70% confidence
90% confidence
Real GDP growth
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
Short−term nominal interest rate
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
a
r
c
h
 
’
0
9
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
J
u
n
e
 
’
0
9
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
 
’
0
9
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
 
’
0
9
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Note: The predictive distributions are derived from stochastic simulations of the NAWM and are centred on
the structural shocks that the model has identiﬁed for the respective Consensus forecast vintage. Consumer
price inﬂation and real GDP growth are expressed in annual terms. The short-term nominal interest rate
corresponds to the annualised 3-month EURIBOR. The lower bound is imposed at interest rate levels between
30 and 70 basis points, reﬂecting the average spread between the EURIBOR and the EONIA over the horizon
of the respective forecast vintage.
39Figure A: Predictive distributions for consumer price inﬂation, real GDP growth and the
short-term nominal interest rate, December ’08 to December ’11. (cont’d)
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40Figure A: Predictive distributions for consumer price inﬂation, real GDP growth and the
short-term nominal interest rate, December ’08 to December ’11. (cont’d)
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